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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING MERLIN'S
INTEREST IN THE BEAR LAKE CABIN WAS ENTIRELY MARITAL.

The trial court abused its discretion in finding Merlin's
premarital family cabin was entirely marital property.

Because

the portion of the trial court's decision with respect to the
cabin is an abuse of discretion, this Court must reverse that
portion of the decision.

The trial Court entered its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 13, 1999.

R. 132-144.

The trial court committed an abuse of discretion by finding
that the Bear Lake Cabin was marital property.

As noted in the

Finding of Fact, the trial court found that the property was
owned by Merlin prior to the parties marriage.

R. 135-136.

Further, the court specifically found that all premarital
property should be awarded to the party who brought it into the
marriage unless an exception to that rule applies as guided by
Mortensen v. Mortensen.
In Mortensen, the Court laid out exceptions to the rule the
general rule that separate property, together with the
appreciation thereof, should be awarded to the party who brought
the property into the marriage.

Specifically, the Court in

Mortensen, stated that separate property may be considered
marital property if "the other spouse has contributed to the
augmentation, improvement, or operation of the property or has
3

significantly cared for, protected or preserved it."

Id. at 306.

Merlin believes that Louise conduct during the marriage does
rise to the level of meeting the exceptions set forth in
Mortensen as a matter of law and therefore the court abused its
discretion.
Louise testified that Merlin owned the cabin at the time of
the parties marriage.

TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L.12-13.

Louise

testified that an addition was made to the cabin after the
parties marriage.

TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 18-19.

Louise testified

that she did not know how the addition was paid for.
p. 47, L. 7-9.

TT. Vol. I,

The Cabin was titled in the names of Merlin and

LaVonne Symes, with LaVonne being Merlin's first wife.
I, p. 53, L. 3-5.

TT. Vol.

Louise testified that during the marriage when

the parties went to the cabin she cooked the meals, washed the
dishes, cleaned, weeded and planted flowers.
Line 5-11.

TT. Vol. I, p. 56,

On cross examination, Louise testified that she had

not been to the cabin since 1996.

TT. Vol. I, p. 163, L. 1-2.

Louise admitted that title to the cabin and lot had never been in
her name.

TT.

Vol. I, p. 198, L. 20-23.

Louise did not know

where the money came from to repurchase the adjoining lot at Bear
Lake which had been previously sold.

TT. Vol. I, p. 205, L. 9-

11.
In contrast to Louise testimony about her alleged
contributions to the Cabin and Lot, Merlin testified that the
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addition to the cabin was paid for by his adult sons.
II, p. 362, L. 20-21.

TT. Vol.

Merlin testified that most of the

improvements to the cabin were performed by his sons using
salvage materials and that he contributed not more than $5,000.00
to that effort including the carpeting.

TT. Vol. II, page 408,

L.5-19.
Merlin believes that the trial court abused its discretion
in determining that any portion of the Bear Lake Property was
marital under the exceptions found in Mortensen.

It is a

standard rule of construction that words are to be given their
plain meaning.

In the present case, Louise's own testimony is

that she did nothing significant to augment the value of the
property other than to lend some of her premarital property to
furnish the cabin and to perform routine chores while at the
property.

Louise did not make any improvement to the property

nor did she contribute to the operation of the property.
did not significantly care for the property.

Louise

She did not protect

the property nor did she preserve the property.

Rather, when

Louise and the family used the property, she did some chores
which were related to the care of the family and persons who were
there.

This is not legally sufficient to meet the standard set

forth in Mortensen.

As such, the Court erred in determining that

any portion of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot were marital property.
The Bear Lake Cabin was and remains separate property and should

5

be awarded to Merlin, free and clear of any interest in Louise.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
APPORTION TO MERLIN THE PREMARITAL VALUE OF THE CABIN AND
THE APPRECIATION THEREOF.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to
apportion to Merlin his premarital interest in the cabin and
award it to Merlin as separate property.

Because the decision is

an abuse of discretion, this Court should reverse the lower
court's decision.
Willard Peterson, a real estate appraiser specializing in
appraisals of property surrounding Bear Lake, testified that he
performed an appraisal valued the property on which the cabin
sits with its improvements at $119,000.00.
Line 1.

TT. Vol. I, p. 120,

Mr. Peterson stated that the remodeling and addition had

added very little value to the cabin because it was not
professionally done.

TT. Vol. I, p. 120, L. 14-17.

Mr. Peterson

stated that the value of the addition was $29,000.00.

Of that

amount Merlins sums from a prior marriage contribute all but
$5,000 TT. Vol. II, p.408, L. 5-19, Vol. II, p.362, L.20-21.
Vol. I, p. 124, L. 9-11.

Mr. Peterson testified that the A-Frame

Cabin without the addition had a value of $40,000.00.
I, p. 124, L. 6-8.

TT.

TT. Vol.

Mr. Peterson testified that the Lot alone

had a value of $50,000.00.

TT. Vol. I, , p. 125, L. 19-21. As

stated above, it was undisputed that the original A-Frame cabin
and lot was pre-marital and that the only contribution to the
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enhancement of the property was cleaning, hard work, and a $5,000
contribution by Merlin to the work done by Merlin's sons.

On

those facts it is clearly error not to award the cabin to Merlin
free and clear of any interest in Louise.
It is the rule of law in this state that premarital
property, together with the appreciation thereof, should normally
be awarded to the party who brought that property into the
marriage.

See Mortensen; See Also Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133,

135 (Utah 1987); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah
App. 1988); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992);
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991); and Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah App. 1990).

Because of the

relatively minor contributions from the marital estate (as
compared to the separate contributions by Merlin's children to a
cabin that was held separately as non-marital property), Merlin
does not believe that the exceptions to the Rule applies
previously argued.
The Court did in fact provide Merlin with some credit for
the premarital value of the property.

However, this value did

not reflect the appreciation of the premarital interest as shown
by the only evidence presented to the Court at trial.
Specifically, the Court awarded to Merlin a premarital interest
in the property in the amount of $12,000.00.
value was considered marital property.

7

The balance of the

To ignore the only

credible evidence and so rule was an abuse of discretion.
See cases cited in previous paragraph.

There was specific

testimony from Willard Peterson who stated the aggregate value of
the property was $119,000.00.

Further, Mr. Peterson stated that

the value of the improvements to the Cabin was $29,000.00.
Therefore, all of the balance of the value of the Bear Lake Cabin
was premarital property and the appreciation thereof, in the
amount of $90,000.00.

It was a clear abuse of discretion for the

trial court to place a higher value of $29,000.00 to the
improvements and ignore that most of those improvements were paid
for by Merlin's children.
It was additionally error to award Louise the marital
residence in Layton. Specifically, the Court found that the
Layton residence was valued at $141,000.00.

The Court found a

value for the Layton residence based on the appraisal, reduced
that amount by Merlin's separate contribution (proceeds of a
Workers Comp claim) and adding in the proceeds of the sale of a
condo and arrived at the figure for the marital estate's interest
of $120,674.00.

Because the actual improvements to the Bear Lake

Property was only $29,000.00,(all but $5,000 of which was paid
for by Merlin's children), the Court should not have awarded to
Louise, more than $14,500.00.

Merlin's one half interest in the

net value of the Layton residence was $60,337.00.

Louise's

interest in the Bear Lake Cabin should have been offset against
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Merlin's interest in the Layton property.

Instead the Court

awarded her the entire Layton property valued at $120,674 and
awarded Merlin the cabin (having a marital value that could not
exceed $29,000).

It was an abuse of discretion to do so.

Alternatively, this Court should adopt a formula for
addressing the division of real property in which there are
separate property interests.

This concept was set forth in Judge

Michael D. Lyon's article in the Utah Bar Journal, entitled, The

Source of Funds Rule-Equitably
Property,

Classifying

Separate

and

Marital

which sets a formulaic approach to the division of both

marital and non-marital assets.

Pursuant to the theory, called

the "Source of Funds Rule" the initial step is to determine how
and when the property was acquired.

Using the present case as an

example, there are two parcels of real property with an aggregate
gross value of

$260,000.00.

Neither property has a mortgage.

Under the source of funds rule, property may be separate,
marital or mixed.

For instance, in the present case, the

property is both marital and mixed because of the lump sum
contribution made to the Layton residence by Merlin and Merlin's
premarital ownership of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot.

Under this

rule, formulas determine value or net equity (separate
contributions + marital contributions + appreciation); marital
interest [present value(marital contributions/total
contributions)]; separate interest [present value(separate
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contributions/total contributions)]; separate contributions (FMV
at time of marriage -mortgage at time of marriage); and marital
contributions (mortgage at time of marriage -mortgage at time of
divorce).

This approach is consistent with principles of

equitable distribution adopted by this Court and provides a
uniform standard for trial judges to apply in the future.
Applying the above stated formulas to the numbers in the
present case would reach an equitable result which would
recognize Merlin's separate property and the appreciation thereon
as well as divide the parties marital contributions and the
appreciation thereon equally.

Merlin urges this Court to adopt

the formulas set forth in the Source of Funds Rules as a method
of standardizing the achievement of equitable distribution of
separate and mixed property in this state and to remand to the
trial court with instructions to do so.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
DIVIDE THE COSTS OF VALUING PROPERTY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to charge
the marital estate and divide the costs of the appraisals used by
the Court in determining property values.

It is axiomatic that

the trial court has the discretion to award costs in divorce
proceedings.

Merlin recognizes that pursuant to the current Utah

case law, appraisal and accounting fees which are incurred in
preparation for a divorce trial cannot be taxed as costs.
10

Morgan

v. Morgan,795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990).

However, Merlin

believes that in instances such as the present case, where the
Court finds an appraised value consistent with the only appraisal
performed, each party should bear responsibility for half of the
costs associated therewith.

Making such a distribution promotes

equity in equitable distribution rather than requiring one party
to bear all of the costs of producing that evidence for the
Court.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING POST
TRIAL MOTIONS FOR TAKING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

The court abused its discretion in denying post trial
motions to take additional evidence on the monies received from
the sale of the St. George condominium and the value of the cabin
at the time of the marriage.

Merlin filed a motion for

reconsideration or alternatively to reopen the divorce proceeding
to take additional evidence.

There were significant discovery

failures on the part of Appellee and Merlin's counsel was
surprised at trial by Louise's counsels efforts to divide
proceeds from the sale of a condo that had occurred three years
prior to the parties separation.
trial court.

This Motion was denied by the

Merlin believes it was an abuse of discretion for

the trial court to deny his motion when said motion was timely
filed and revealed to the Court that additional evidence which
could not have reasonably been anticipated as needed would aid
the Court in a proper determination of the issues before it. The
11

Court erred in not allowing that evidence to be introduced.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion by deciding that the
entire cabin and lot at Bear Lake was marital property.

Even

assuming that it was marital property, it was an additional abuse
of discretion for the trial court to fail to award to Merlin the
reasonable premarital value of the cabin together with the
appreciation thereon as testified by the appraiser which was the
only evidence received at trial on that subject.

This Court

should adopt the source of funds rule as a formulaic method of
dealing with real property values in the context of a divorce
proceeding.

Finally, the trial court abused its discretion by

denying Merlin's post trial motion for reconsideration or
alternatively to reopen the trial to take additional evidence on
an issue that was not included in the pretrial order and could
not have been reasonably anticipated by Merlin's attorney as a
trial issue.

This Court should reverse the decision of the trial

court.
Dated and Signed this

day of December, 1999.

Steven C. Tycksen
Attorney for Appellant
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